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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
 
RUNNING AFOUL OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT: 
EXPEDITED REMOVAL UNDER THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
REFORM AND IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 (hereinafter “IIRIRA”)2 brought about some of the most calculated and 
sweeping changes in the immigration laws of the United States in recent 
decades,3 the procedures established for the summary removal of certain 
arriving immigrants are among the most severe in effect.  Under IIRIRA, 
persons who arrive in the U.S. with documentation “determined” by the 
inspecting immigration official to be insufficient or to have been procured by 
fraud are subject to “expedited removal” from the United States by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.).4  Too often, however, the 
 
 1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, Art. 33, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137, 176 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The near-
totality of the provisions of that Convention, including Article 33, were incorporated by reference 
into the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, New York, January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, (entered into force October 4, 1967.) The Protocol, which the United 
States signed in 1968, removed the time and geographical limitations of the term “refugee.” 
 2. Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (Codified in various sections of Title 8 of 
the U.S. Code).  The provisions of IIRIRA discussed herein went into effect on April 1, 1997. 
 3. The last comprehensive overhaul of the Immigration and Nationality Act is considered to 
have been the Immigration Act of 1952. 
 4. Under IIRIRA, an arriving alien who is found to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 
(a)(6)(C) (1998) (for seeking admission by fraud or willful misrepresentation) or under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182  (a)(7)(A) (for lack of valid documents for admission at the time entry to the United States is 
sought) is subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1) (1998). 
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inspection mechanisms established by IIRIRA fail to account for the 
circumstances that caused a particular immigrant to arrive in the U.S. in the 
first place.  Indeed, the procedures set up under IIRIRA for determining an 
arriving immigrant’s eligibility for political asylum do not provide adequate 
guarantees against “non-refoulement” of refugees as required of the U.S. by 
international law. 
Until the advent of IIRIRA, the Immigration and Nationality Act contained 
measures that were designed to protect refugees.  IIRIRA creates the 
possibility that individuals who meet the criteria for the basic protection of 
non-refoulement will nevertheless be summarily removed from the U.S. and 
returned to their country of origin.  IIRIRA requires the application of 
standards more strict than those prescribed by international law for making 
eligibility determinations for refugee protections. IIRIRA transgresses the 
norms of international refugee law by allowing for the possibility that an 
arriving immigrant who meets the lower threshold prescribed by international 
law to be returned to his or her country of origin,.5 
The importance of non-refoulement cannot and indeed, under IIRIRA, will 
not often be told by persons who benefited from the protection IIRIRA 
pretends to offer.  As it now stands, the consequences of expedited removal lie 
with those who have been removed to places from which they may never 
return to speak of its failings.  Beneath the relegation of what has for so long 
been regarded as “the Golden Door”6 to the status of a mere ‘revolving door’ 
are violations of international law perpetrated by I.N.S. officials each day at 
ports of entry into the United States. 
I.N.S. inspectors at ports of entry are now empowered to make 
determinations so crucial that the life of the immigrant seeking admission often 
hangs in the balance.  If an arriving immigrant who is thought to lack proper 
entry documents does not express— to the satisfaction of the inspecting 
officer—(who are often overworked and largely untrained in asylum law) a 
“credible fear” of returning to his or her country of origin, he or she may be 
placed on the next plane bound for the very country he or she has fled.7  It is all 
 
 5. Carolyn Patty Blum, A Question of Values: Continuing Divergences Between U.S. and 
International Refugee Norms,  15 BERK. J. INT’L LAW 38, 48 (1997). “[T]he appropriate 
screening standard for asylum seekers at the border is whether their claims are ‘manifestly 
unfounded,’ a standard requiring far less proof than the United States’ credible fear of 
persecution.” (Citing the position of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) as expressed in UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 30 (1983)). 
 6. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus 1, (1888). 
 7. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(A)(i) (1996) states “the officer shall order the alien removed from 
the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to 
apply for asylum under section 208 [8 U.S.C. § 1158] or a fear of persecution.” 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1999] RUNNING AFOUL OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT 293 
the more disconcerting, then, that the decision of such inspecting officials to 
admit or exclude an immigrant is not subject to judicial review.8 
By failing to ensure adequate means within the inspection process for 
identifying and giving meaningful notice of the protections available to 
persons who meet the international definition of “refugee”, the Immigration 
and Nationality Act as amended by IIRIRA violates both U.S. obligations 
under international treaties as well as peremptory norms of international law.  
Specifically, the obligation to honor the principle of “non-refoulement”9 is 
jeopardized severely by the limited access IIRIRA affords to the asylum 
mechanisms of U.S. immigration law.  Further, many of the changes wrought 
by IIRIRA reverse any progress towards bringing U.S. domestic refugee law 
into line with international law in that same area.10  This comment will set 
forth the removal procedures instituted by IIRIRA and illustrate the manner in 
which they contravene U.S. obligations under international law.  It will 
ultimately examine the difficulties associated with bringing international law to 
bear in U.S. courts in a potential challenge to some of the most severe 
provisions of IIRIRA as they relating to non-refoulement. 
II.  IIRIRA:  A NEW IMMIGRATION REGIME 
A.  Admissibility under IIRIRA 
Under the inspection process for persons arriving in the United States as 
established by IIRIRA, one who has not yet entered the United States is 
considered to be an “applicant for admission.”11  Admissibility may be 
established by showing proof of U.S. citizenship, lawful permanent residency, 
or other similar status or by presenting a valid visa obtained abroad.12  Non-
citizens who possess facially valid entry documents may nonetheless be 
deemed inadmissible for any number of reasons, including having committed 
fraud in obtaining their visa, as a result of prior criminal convictions, or 
 
 8. See Id. and 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(A) (1998) (disallowing judicial review of any action 
taken in the context of expedited removal.) 
 9. The principle of non-refoulement is set forth in Article 33 of the U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees. (See note 1, supra.)  This principle was incorporated into U.S. 
law at 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (b)(3) (1980). 
 10. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, was enacted with the objective of 
bringing U.S. law into accordance with the provisions of the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees.  See S. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1980). 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (a)(1) (1996) states “An alien present in the United States who has not 
been admitted or who arrives in the United States shall be deemed for purposes of this Act an 
applicant for admission.” 
 12. 8 U.S.C. § 1181 (1998). 
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pursuant to a previous order of deportation or removal.13  The forum in which 
the admissibility of different categories of applicants is determined varies.14 
The new threshold determination of whether an immigrant has been 
“admitted” does away with the prior concept of “entry” into the U.S. 15  The 
change, however, extends well beyond the difference in the term of art used.  
Under the previous legal regime, if an I.N.S. inspector felt an applicant for 
admission should be excluded from the U.S., the person was referred for an 
evidentiary hearing held before an immigration judge.  Thus, to the extent that 
the decision rendered in the initial administrative procedure was adverse to the 
immigrant, a judicial procedure followed.  The decision of an immigration 
judge made in exclusion proceedings was then subject to review by the Board 
of Immigration Appeals and the Federal District Courts.  IIRIRA, on the other 
hand, authorizes the Attorney General to treat even persons who have not been 
admitted and are subsequently found within the United States in the same 
manner as arriving immigrants.16 
Under the system established by IIRIRA, the availability of procedural 
safeguards against the return of bona fide refugees is severely limited, both by 
“restrict[ing] access to the adjudication system at the front end” and also 
 
 13. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1998). 
 14. Most determinations of admissibility are made by consular officers overseas during the 
visa application process, but similar determinations are made by the inspecting immigration 
officials at the port of entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (1998).  Limited habeas corpus review is 
available to persons claiming to be U.S. citizens or who claim to have been previously admitted 
to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident, refugee or asylee. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (b)(5)(iv) (1998).  
Such determinations, however, are limited to determining whether or not the person making such 
a claim possesses the status asserted. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (1998). 
 15. Under the I.N.A. prior to IIRIRA, one who had entered the U.S. but who could not 
establish the legal manner in which they did so was placed in deportation proceedings and 
ordered to show cause why they should not be deported.  Conversely, one seeking to enter the 
U.S. was placed in exclusion proceedings, where they were required to show their eligibility for 
entry into the U.S.  The legal fiction of the “entry” doctrine created the possibility of a person 
being present in the U.S. without having “entered.”  Under IIRIRA, persons found within the U.S. 
who have not been “admitted” are deemed to be “unlawfully present” and are subject to removal 
proceedings.  8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(A). 
 16. Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights, SLAMMING “THE GOLDEN DOOR”: A YEAR OF 
EXPEDITED REMOVAL 4 (March, 1998) [hereinafter “SLAMMING ‘THE GOLDEN DOOR’”]. In spite 
of being so authorized, the Attorney General has stated that the provisions of expedited removal 
will only be applied to “arriving aliens,” as “application of the expedited removal provisions to 
aliens already in the United States will involve more complex determinations of fact and will be 
more difficult to manage.”  The Department of Justice, has however, reserved the right to apply 
these provisions at any time and in any particular situation.  Inspection and Expedited Removal of 
Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 
62 Fed. Reg. 10, 312-313 (1997).  The Department of Justice subsequently announced in 
September, 1999 that the I.N.S. will begin to apply expedited removal to certain criminal aliens in 
three correctional facilities in the State of Texas on a trial basis for 180 days.  64 Fed. Reg. 51338 
(1999). 
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through the use of “court-stripping provisions [that] virtually eliminate judicial 
review at the back end.”17  The former problem arises during the initial 
inspection process upon arrival into the U.S.  IIRIRA did not change the 
structure of this inspection process. 
B.  Inspection and Removal 
The use of a two-tiered inspection system whereby persons who are not 
immediately found to be admissible by the primary I.N.S. inspector are 
referred for “secondary inspection” is not a new process.  Prior to IIRIRA, a 
secondary inspector who found a person to be excludable due to a lack of 
proper entry documents would place him or her in exclusion proceedings.  
Under IIRIRA, the same official may summarily exclude and simultaneously 
order the removal of a similarly situated immigrant to his or her country of 
origin. This process, dubbed “expedited removal,” has created many disturbing 
scenarios involving would-be asylum seekers, and leaves open the possibility 
of many more.  What would previously have been a decision that could have 
been appealed to administrative and judicial authorities is reduced now to a 
unilateral decision that is subject to the review of a supervisory I.N.S. 
inspector, and, if requested by the immigrant, an immigration judge. 
The consequences of the determinations that will now be made by a 
secondary inspector now greatly exceed the authority previously bestowed 
upon these lower-level officials.  It must be noted that I.N.S. inspectors making 
such determinations will not receive training comparable to that received by 
the asylum officers18 previously charged with making such determinations in 
the case of affirmative asylum applications.19 
A provision of the Act enables persons seeking admission to withdraw 
their application in order to avoid the five year bar to re-entry that accompanies 
an order of expedited removal.20 Such a provision is of no consolation, 
 
 17. SLAMMING “THE GOLDEN DOOR” supra note 16, at 4. 
 18. Asylum officer, as defined by statute, is an immigration officer who— 
(i) has had professional training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview 
techniques comparable to that provided to full-time adjudicators of applications 
under section 208 [8 U.S.C. §1158], and 
(ii) is supervised by an officer who meets the condition described in clause (i) and 
has had substantial experience adjudicating asylum applications. 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(E)(i & ii)  (1998). 
 19. While I.N.S. inspectors must successfully complete “a 14-week basic training program 
and a one-year field training and probationary period,”asylum officers receive training in “asylum 
law, current country conditions and interviewing skills, including techniques for interviewing 
individuals who may be survivors of torture. After initial training, asylum officers continue to 
receive ongoing training in these areas.” U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of 
Public Affairs, FY 1998 Update on Expedited Removals, (June 21, 1999) <http://www.ins.usdoj. 
gov/graphics/publicaffairs/factsheets/Expedite.htm>. 
 20. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) (1998). 
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however, to individuals whose arrival in the U.S. came as a result of 
persecution in their homeland.21  Further, the right to withdraw an application 
for admission is not automatic.22 
The use of expedited removal is limited to applicants for admission who 
either lack any documents entitling them to admission or whose documents 
appear to have been obtained by fraud.23  Nevertheless, the circumstances 
surrounding the departure of many would-be asylum seekers from their 
country of origin are such that they may not have been able to acquire the 
proper documents for admission to the U.S.24  It is for this reason that the 
process of expedited removal is most likely to place asylum-seekers at risk.  
By virtue of arriving in the U.S. without proper entry documents or with 
falsified documents used solely to escape the country in which they faced 
persecution, these individuals are subject to the most harsh treatment available 
under U.S. immigration law: removal without a hearing by an administrative or 
judicial official and a five year bar against re-entering the country. 
Implicit in this harsh treatment of persons with falsified or inadequate 
documentation is the presumption that they are less likely to be genuine 
refugees than those aliens who may be in possession of a U.S. visa.  In fact, 
given the urgency of the circumstances prompting the departure of most 
refugees from their homeland, the contrary would seem to hold true.  
Nevertheless, refugees arriving without a U.S. visa are singled out for adverse 
treatment without the safeguards needed to make an adequate determination as 
to the reason(s) for  their lack of proper documentation. 
The unavailability of judicial review of the determinations made by I.N.S. 
inspectors may be attributed in part to the long standing premise that  “physical 
presence is not necessarily synonymous with legal presence for the purposes of 
determining constitutional guarantees.”25  IIRIRA goes one step further, 
however, by eliminating the possibility of admissibility determinations being 
made in the context of exclusion proceedings before an immigration judge.  
Absent such substantive procedural review by a judge, the secondary 
inspection procedure proves to be entirely dispositive of a refugee’s ability to 
 
 21. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (a)(4), an alien may withdraw his application for admission at the 
discretion of the inspecting officer, and depart immediately from the U.S. 
 22. Permission to withdraw an application for admission is granted at the discretion of the 
inspecting officer. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4).  If the inspectors find no deliberate fraudulent intent or 
other serious violation, the individuals are generally allowed to withdraw their application for 
admission and depart the United States. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of 
Public Affairs, FY 1998 Update on Expedited Removals, (June 21, 1999) supra note 19. 
 23. See supra note 4. 
 24. “Refugees who flee frequently have no time for immigration formalities, and allowance  
for this is contained in Article 31 of the Convention [Relating to the Status of Refugees].” GUY S. 
GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (2d ed.1996). 
 25. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 145. 
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receive the protection required by international law.  The introduction of the 
summarily harsh “expedited removal” procedure is difficult to square with the 
long standing principle of non-refoulement—a landmark of international 
refugee law which the United States adopted many years ago. 
III.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT 
A.  The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 
Protocol 
The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 
provides for refugee protection from expulsion or return (“refoulement”) to a 
country where “his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”26 Both the requirement of non-expulsion and that of non-return 
(“non-refoulement”) have received significant attention, focused largely upon 
the distinction that may exist between these two terms.27  The significance of 
the terms stems from the fact that as their interpretation varies, so too may the 
responsibility of a State towards a refugee. 
The term “expel” connotes a refugee’s presence within a State in the first 
place.  Since the Convention does not require a State to offer admission to a 
refugee,28 it is not entirely clear what responsibility a State has to an arriving 
refugee.  However, the Convention prohibits States from returning refugees “in 
any manner whatsoever” to a land where “his life or freedom would be 
threatened.”29  This restriction sets Article 33(1) apart from other provisions of 
the Convention in that it is not conditioned upon “degrees of presence and 
lawful residence.”30  In fact, it may be considered demonstrative of the intent 
for Article 33 to be interpreted in light of Article 31, which guarantees the 
application of the Convention to refugees regardless of the illegality of their 
entry or presence.31 
With the term “non-refoulement” being added to the Convention, it seems 
more clear that the prohibition against the return of a refugee would include the 
 
 26. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, Art. 33. 
 27. For more in-depth discussion of the various interpretations of these terms as used in the 
Convention, see Elwin Griffith, Problems of Interpretation in Asylum and Withholding of 
Deportation Proceedings Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 255, 275-282 (1996). 
 28. The absence of such a requirement has been found to be a “major drawback” to the non-
refoulement requirement in that it does not preclude temporary protection policies.  See Joan 
Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 237-39 (1996). 
 29. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, Art. 33. 
 30. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 142 
 31. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, at  Art. 31, sec. 1 and Art. 33, sec. 1. 
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return of one who is seeking admission.32  Even the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Sale, Acting Commissioner, INS v. Haitian Centers Council seemed to 
acknowledge that aliens who reach ports of entry are protected by both the 
1951 Convention (Art. 33) as well as the U.S. statute.33  Indeed, “if States 
avoid the mandate of Article 33 by arguing that the refugees are outside their 
borders, they dilute the meaning of “return. . .in any manner whatsoever.”34  
To allow a contrary reading of this Article would be to say “the extent to which 
a refugee is protected – in accordance with the humanitarian aim of the 
Convention – against return to a country in which he fears persecution would 
depend upon the fortuitous circumstance whether he has succeeded in 
penetrating the territory of a contracting State.”35  For this reason, the 
interpretation of Article 33 that imposes two requirements: that of non-
expulsion and of non-return (non-refoulement) provides a more clear notion of 
the intent of the Convention as it relates to the obligations of the party States.36  
It is this very interpretation that was advanced by the Executive Committee of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), when it 
reaffirmed “the fundamental importance of the observance of the principle of 
non-refoulement . . . irrespective of whether or not [individuals] have been 
formally recognized as refugees.”37 
B. Non-refoulement as a Norm of International Law 
Aside from creating an obligation for signatory States to the Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the principle of non-refoulement can be 
said to have risen to the level of a binding norm of international law, if one that 
contains some exceptions.38  Touted as “the most enduring contribution of the 
Convention,” the development of this norm “beyond the bounds of the 
 
 32. The French term “refouler” is most generally associated with the notion of refusing entry 
at the border. Griffith, supra note 27, at 276.  The inclusion of both the term return and refouler 
in the Convention may be best attributed to the variance among the procedures for admission of 
persons to individual party States.  Indeed, the issue of non-refoulement would not be an issue in 
a State where procedures were limited to expulsion and deportation as opposed to refusal of 
admission. Id. at 277, n. 113. 
 33. 509 U.S. 155, 182, 113 S.Ct. 2549, 2564 (1993). 
 34. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, (quoted in Griffith, supra note 27, at 280). 
 35. Paul Weis, Territorial Asylum, 6 IJIL 1966, 173, 183, (quoted in GUNNEL STENBERG, 
NON-EXPULSION AND NON-REFOULEMENT, 176 (1989)). 
 36. “The expulsion restriction prohibits the removal of an alien from a contracting State, 
whereas the “return” restriction prohibits the return of an alien at or outside of the border back to 
the place of danger.” Griffith, supra note 27. In support of this position, Griffith cites GOODWIN-
GILL, supra note 18, wherein he establishes that “Refoulement is directed to the [category of 
refugees unlawfully within or outside a State’s territory.]” Griffith, supra note  22 at 279, n. 127. 
 37. Conclusion Endorsed by the Executive Committee on Non-refoulement, U.N. GAOR, 
32nd Session, Supp. No. 12A, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/32/12/Add.1 (1977). 
 38. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 167. 
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Convention” is of tremendous significance in that it creates a requirement even 
for States that are not parties to either the Convention or the Protocol.39  The 
“crystallization” of the principle of non-refoulement into a customary norm is a 
process that has been traced by the UNHCR Executive Committee in its annual 
Conclusions.40  In 1981, the ExComm urged that even in situations involving a 
mass influx, “the fundamental principle of non-refoulement—including non-
rejection at the frontier—must be scrupulously observed.”41  The following 
year, the Committee noted that non-refoulement was “progressively acquiring 
the character of a peremptory rule of international law.”42  While the 
conclusions of the Executive Committee do not create binding obligations, 
they constitute a contribution to the opinio juris of States.43  When coupled 
with consistent State practice, the opinio juris can be said to have given rise to 
jus cogens—a peremptory norm. This notion was reinforced when the 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees was issued in 1984, declaring non-
refoulement to be “a corner-stone of the international protection of refugees” 
that should be acknowleged and observed as a rule of jus cogens.44  State 
practice has confirmed that “the duty of nonrefoulement extends beyond 
expulsion and return and applies to measures such as rejection at the 
frontier.”45 
Evidence of State practice which conforms with the principle of non-
refoulement may be found in subsequent international agreements which 
specifically refer to it.  One such agreement is the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.46  This Convention incorporates the principle of non-refoulement 
and applies it to persons who would face torture if returned to their country of 
origin.  Specifically, Article 3, paragraph 1 of that Convention requires that 
“no State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite (in the case of an 
immigrant already present in the country) a person to another State where there 
 
 39. Fitzpatrick, supra note 28, at 252. 
 40. Executive Committee Conclusion No. 22 U.N. GAOR, 36th Session, Supp. No. 12A at 
18, U.N. Doc. A/36/12/Add.1 (1981). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Report of the 33rd Session: U.N. doc. A/AC.96/614, para. 70 (1982) (cited in GOODWIN-
GILL, supra note 24, at 127). 
 43. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 128. 
 44. 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Nov. 22, 1984, reprinted in Annual Report of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1 
(1984-85) (quoted in PIRKKO KOURULA, BROADENING THE EDGES: REFUGEE DEFINITION AND 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION REVISITED 276 (1997)). 
 45. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Nonrefoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW 
ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980S THE NINTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 103, 105 (David A. Martin, ed. 1986). 
 46. Opened for signature February 4, 1984, G.A. res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. NO. 51, 
at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter “Convention Against Torture”]. 
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are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.”47 
The Convention Against Torture’s use of language paralleling that of the 
Refugee Convention while further recognizing the need for protection of 
persons already present in the country seeking to remove them lends further 
credence to the notion that non-refoulement has risen to the level of a 
customary norm of international law.  At the same time, it creates an additional 
class of persons who may not be subjected to return or rejection at the border 
of a state where they seek refuge. 
IV.  CLARIFYING THE OBLIGATIONS OF NON-REFOULEMENT 
A.  The Duty of States: Protection, Not Admission 
A significant part of the debate surrounding the principle of non-
refoulement stems from the fact that States have attempted to blur the 
responsibilities that the principle creates for them. States have attempted to 
shift the focus away from the risks faced by refugees who may be forcibly 
returned to their country of origin, instead focusing on the prospect of a mass 
influx of immigrants.  The concern surrounding a potential mass migration into 
a State is certainly not without basis.  The fact remains, however, that States, 
especially those which are signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 
1967 Protocol, are duty bound not to forcibly return (‘refouler’) or otherwise 
reject persons arriving at its borders who have either a well-founded fear of 
persecution or who have grounds for believing that a danger of torture exists if 
returned to their home country.48  Indeed, “[t]he application of the principle of 
nonrefoulement is independent of any formal determination of refugee status 
by a state or an international organization”49 making it applicable “as soon as 
certain objective conditions occur.”50  In this manner, 
a state may be liable for a breach of the duty of nonrefoulement regardless of 
notions of fault, either directly for the acts and omissions of its officials, or 
indirectly where its legal and administrative systems fail to provide a remedy 
or guarantee which is required by an applicable international standard.51 
 
 47. Id. Art. 3, para. 1. 
 48. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 139. 
 49. Goodwin-Gill, Nonrefoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, supra note 45, at 105 
(citing the Report of the UNHCR, paras. 22-23, U.N. Doc. E/1985/62 (1985); Report of the 
Twenty-eighth session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 
para. 53 (4)(c), U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/549 (1977)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 105-06. 
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Based upon the enactment of IIRIRA and the manner in which it has been 
implemented, the United States may be said to have breached its duty under 
international law on both counts. 
B.  The Problem with U.S. Policy: Splitting Hairs to Avoid Its Obligation 
Acknowledging the concern of States with the prospect of mass migration, 
it is important to clarify the duty owed to arriving refugees.  In fact, the 
principle of non-refoulement does not require a State to admit or grant asylum 
to a refugee.  It does, however, “enjoin any action on the part of a state which 
returns or has the effect of returning refugees to territories where their lives or 
freedom may be threatened.”52 While the ultimate effect of non-refoulement 
may require temporary refuge, “[i]t is a mistake to make the leap from 
nonrefoulement to asylum.”53 It is in this respect that the United States failed 
during the Haitian refugee crisis, as it blurred the line between admitting 
refugees and not returning them to their country of origin.  In a carefully 
worded statement to the United Nations, the United States defended itself as 
follows: “[the U.S.] did not consider that the non-refoulement obligation under 
Article 33 of the Convention included an obligation to admit an asylum 
seeker.”54  Even if this assertion is true, it does not serve to excuse the U.S. 
from the obligation of non-refoulement.  By appealing to the lack of an 
obligation to provide asylum, the U.S. “failed to notice that non-refoulement is 
not so much about admission to a State, as about not returning refugees to 
where their lives or freedom may be endangered.”55  Expedited removal may 
well have been conceived as a means of circumventing this very dilemma.  The 
distinction between non-refoulement and admission may become somewhat 
blurred in cases where no third country will accept a genuine refugee arriving 
at a U.S. port of entry.  Such a dilemma does not, however, undermine the U.S. 
obligation of non-refoulement. 
States undermine the most fundamental basis of non-refoulement by 
placing short-term national interests above a potential threat to the life or 
freedom of refugees. Any fear that refugees may remain in a State does not 
mitigate that State’s duty not to return them to their country of origin in those 
situations: 
the variety of procedural limitations governing applications for refugee status 
and asylum, as well as the tendency of States to interpret their own and other 
States’ duties in the light of sovereign self-interest, all contribute to a negative 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 112. 
 54. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 132. 
 55. Id. 
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situation potentially capable of leading to breach of the fundamental principle 
of non-refoulement.56 
The tendency of U.S. courts and lawmakers alike to find a lack of standing 
or of substantive rights for arriving immigrants demonstrates all the more the 
need for compliance with international norms of non-refoulement.  The duty of 
the United States under international law not to return or to reject refugees 
exists independent of the rights of any individual.57  The United States has 
effectively shirked its responsibility to refugees by confusing the lack of 
individual rights with a lack of a duty towards the refugees themselves.  The 
expedited removal provisions of IIRIRA are an unfortunate product of this 
confusion, and their continued enforcement carries with it a significant risk 
that individuals arriving in the United States will be forcibly returned to the 
risk having their basic human rights violated. 
V. U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
A. Reconciling U.S. Law with Treaty Obligations: The Refugee Act of 1980 
While the United States was not a party to the original Convention of 
1951, it ultimately signed the subsequent Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees in 1967.58  Prior to that time, nothing in U.S. law provided absolute 
protection from refoulement (forcible return).59  The Protocol became effective 
for the United States on November 1, 1968,60 but adherence to the principle of 
non-refoulement remained discretionary until Congress passed the Refugee Act 
of 198061 making the U.S. compliant with the requirements imposed upon it as 
a signatory State.62  By attending to such fundamental details as introducing a 
definition of a refugee into U.S. law,63 the Refugee Act began to provide a 
 
 56. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Protection of Refugees and the Safe Third Country Rule in 
International Law, in ASYLUM LAW 89, 91 (Judicial Conference on Asylum Law ed., 1995). 
 57. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 171. 
 58. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1. The Protocol 
incorporated by reference all but the first Article of the Convention (limiting its application to 
persons who were made refugees by events occurring prior to January 1, 1951) and provided for a 
prospective application thereof. Id. Art. I, §§ 1 and 2. 
 59. GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE GLOBAL 
REFUGEE CRISIS 58, n. 5 (1993). 
 60. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1. 
 61. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 8 
U.S.C.). 
 62. Maureen O’Connor-Hurley, The Asylum Process: Past, Present and Future, 26 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 995, 1006 (1992) (quoted in Mary McGee Light, Note: The Well-Founded Fear 
Standard in Refugee Asylum: Will it Still Provide Hope for the Oppressed?  45 DRAKE L. REV. 
789, 792 n. 36 (1997)). 
 63. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) defines a refugee as “any person who is outside of any 
country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
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legal mechanism through which refugees could seek protection in the United 
States.64  New provisions allowed for grants of asylum on a discretionary basis 
for persons who met the refugee definition.65 
One of the more notable inclusions in the Refugee Act was the mandatory 
prohibition of the return of an alien to his or her country of origin if his or her 
life or freedom would be endangered.66  The “withholding of deportation” 
provision was duplicative of a type of relief already available through asylum 
provisions.  Its inclusion in U.S. law represented an important advance in that 
it codified the requirement of non-refoulement into the domestic law of the 
U.S.  In this manner, the U.S. fulfilled the obligation imposed upon it by virtue 
of it being a signatory to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.67 
B. U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture 
The United States became a signatory to the Convention Against Torture in 
October, 1988 and it entered into force in November, 1994.68  On October 21, 
1998, Congress enacted legislation requiring “heads of appropriate agencies 
[to] prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United States 
Under Article 3 of the [Convention Against Torture].”69  Pursuant to this 
directive, the I.N.S. promulgated regulations establishing procedures for 
raising a claim for protection from torture.70  In the context of expedited 
removal,  a person making an Article 3 claim undergoes the same “credible 
fear” screening as an asylum-seeker, with the exception that once he is before 
an immigration judge, he may assert a claim to withholding of removal or 
 
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return 
to, and who is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 
 64. McGee Light, supra note 62 at 793. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Originally codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (h) (“Withholding of Deportation”) and now 
found at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (“Restriction on Removal”).  Withholding of deportation was 
previously discretionary, but under the Refugee Act of 1980 was made mandatory, in addition to 
including provisions designed to prevent persecutors and criminals from benefiting from its 
protection. 
 67. The provision for the “withholding of deportation” of certain aliens based upon 
endangerment in his country of origin “is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it 
is intended that it be construed consistent with the Protocol.”  H.R. CONF. REP. 96-781 (1980), 
reprinted in U.S.C.A.A.N. 160, 161 (1980). 
 68. Convention Against Torture, supra note 46. 
 69. Section 2242(b) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). 
 70. 64 Fed. Reg. 8478 (1999). 
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deferral of removal in addition to the possibility of seeking asylum.71  
Nevertheless, in order for Article 3 claims under the Convention Against 
Torture to be heard, the applicants must overcome the obstacle of secondary 
inspection.  As a result,  the risk of refoulement remains. 
C. Treatment of Asylum-Seekers Under IIRIRA 
Within the context of the inspection process, IIRIRA includes measures 
directed at immigrants who may be eligible for political asylum in the U.S.72  
Under these provisions, if an immigrant who is otherwise subject to expedited 
removal expresses either a desire to apply for asylum or expresses a fear of 
persecution, the I.N.S. inspector is required by law to refer them to an asylum 
officer73 for an interview.74  Any such referral would take place during the 
secondary stage of inspection.  If the I.N.S. official fails, for whatever reason, 
to ascertain that the “applicant for admission” has a credible fear of returning 
to his country of origin, the immigrant is subject to expedited removal and left 
without any recourse for review of the decision. 
Advocates of expedited removal view cite to the high percentage of 
immigrants found to have a “credible fear” in the course of their interview with 
an asylum officer75 as evidence of an effective, comprehensive screening 
process.  Quite obviously, these numbers do not account for the individuals 
who were not referred from secondary inspection for an interview with an 
asylum officer due to an adverse determination by the I.N.S. officer conducting 
the inspection.  The shortcomings of the expedited removal process are best 
illustrated then, by a closer examination of the secondary inspection process as 
it relates to asylum-seekers. 
VI. IIRIRA AND NON-REFOULEMENT: A TEST OF COMPATIBILITY 
A.  Secondary Inspection:  The Moment of Truth 
For immigrants subject to expedited removal, secondary inspection 
represents the crucial moment in which any fear of returning to their country 
must emerge if they are to avoid summary repatriation.  An immigrant ordered 
 
 71. Id. at 8484. 
 72. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 (b)(1)(A)(ii) and (b)(1)(B) et seq. (1996) provide procedures for the 
inspection of persons asserting an asylum claim. 
 73. An asylum officer is defined as “an immigration officer who has had professional 
training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques comparable to that provided 
to full-time adjudicators of [asylum] applications. . .and has had substantial experience 
adjudicating asylum applications.”  8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(E). 
 74. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 75. Bo Cooper, Procedures for Expedited Removal and Asylum Screening Under the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. 29 CONN. L. REV. 1501, 1523 
(1997). 
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removed after secondary inspection is preempted from an interview with an 
asylum officer.76  It is for this reason that the same guarantees afforded to those 
who undergo a “credible fear” interview must be afforded to individuals in 
secondary inspection.  The failure to provide information regarding the 
secondary inspection process and the availability of protections for refugees in 
a manner that is meaningful to the immigrant (in his or her own language) 
could result in his or her removal.  It is not surprising, then, that the concerns 
that have been raised regarding the conduct of secondary inspections include: 
I.N.S. failure to provide adequate information about the process, abusive 
conduct of I.N.S. officials during secondary inspection, a lack of 
confidentiality of the interview, and inadequate translation services.77 
I.N.S. officials involved in the secondary phase of inspection are required 
to observe certain procedures aimed at apprising immigrants of the nature of 
the proceedings in which they find themselves.78  On the form used by the 
I.N.S. in its interviews, however, no specific mention is made of the 
availability of asylum.79  The applicable statute falls short of ensuring that 
aliens eligible for asylum will be apprised of the availability of same: “[t]he 
Attorney General shall provide information concerning the asylum 
interview. . .to aliens who may be eligible.”80  The safeguards provided within 
the context of expedited removal  depend largely upon their being provided by  
the I.N.S. inspector. 
The inspector is required to inform the alien of  the possibility of speaking 
to another officer about any concern he may have regarding being returned to 
his country of origin.81  The difference in the availability of review of the 
asylum officer’s decision is not mentioned.82  There is, however, a series of 
three questions to be asked of the alien to ascertain whether he or she has a fear 
of returning to his or her country.83  According to a study conducted by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO), inspectors failed to document asking at 
least one of the three required questions between an estimated 1 and 18 percent 
 
 76. SLAMMING “THE GOLDEN DOOR”,  supra note16, at 9. 
 77. Id. at 9-13. 
 78. Id. at 9. 
 79. Department of Justice, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Form I-867A/B, 
“Record of Sworn Statement in Proceedings under Section 235 (b)(1) of the Act.” 
 80. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(B)(iv). 
 81. Form I-867A, supra note 79. 
 82. Id. 
 83. The questions are: “[1.]Why did you leave your home country or country of last 
residence? [2.] Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to your home country or 
being removed from the United States? [3.] Would you be harmed if you returned to your home 
country or country of last residence?”  Department of Justice, Form I-867B, “Jurat for Record of 
Sworn Statement in Proceedings under Section 235 (b)(1) of the Act.” 
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of the time.84  Such practice represents a failure on the part of the I.N.S. to 
adhere to its own stated procedure, under which “[n]o alien can be 
expeditiously removed from the United States until they are read, and 
acknowledge they understand, a sworn statement and asked three specific 
questions concerning whether they have a concern or fear of being returned to 
their home country.”85 
Once an intent to apply for asylum or a fear of return has been indicated by 
the alien, the regulations used by the I.N.S. require that officials “record 
sufficient information . . . to establish . . . that the alien had indicated such 
intention, fear, or concern.”86  This regulation seems to go beyond the statutory 
indications for referral of aliens for an interview by an asylum officer.87  An 
internal I.N.S. memorandum only exacerbates this by instructing the inspector 
to “ask enough follow-up questions to ascertain the general nature of the fear 
or concern.”88  Such instruction clearly exceeds the bounds of the role set forth 
for inspectors, as “[t]he legislative scheme anticipates that false claims will be 
identified by trained Asylum Officers at credible fear interviews—not by low-
level inspectors at the airport.”89 
In the context of expedited removal, any hope for a guarantee of protection 
for refugees depends directly upon the integrity of the procedures established 
and the adherence of immigration officials to the same. Since the I.N.S. 
procedures have already been found to be lacking in specific respects, the 
faithful adherence of officials to the few requirements that exist is all the more 
crucial, as “[p]rocedural safeguards are of vital importance from the very first 
moment that the examination of an asylum claim begins.”90 
B. Secondary Inspection and Minimum Guarantees of Non-refoulement 
Defenders of the expedited removal procedures currently in place have 
attempted to find support within international instruments for the abbreviated 
 
 84. United States General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Changes in the Process of 
Denying Aliens Entry Into the United States. GAO/GGD-98-81, 43 (March, 1998) [hereinafter 
GAO Report]. 
 85. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Public Affairs, FY 1998 Update 
on Expedited Removals, (June 21, 1999) supra note 19. 
 86. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (b)(4). 
 87. “If an immigration officer determines that an alien. . .who is arriving in the United 
States. . . [is subject to expedited removal]. . .and the alien indicates either an intention to apply 
for asylum. . .or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer the alien for an interview with an 
asylum officer. . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(A)(ii). (emphasis added). 
 88. I.N.S. Memorandum re: Implementation of Expedited Removal, at para. 7 (Mar. 31, 
1997) (quoted in SLAMMING “THE GOLDEN DOOR”,  supra note 16, at 13). 
 89. SLAMMING “THE GOLDEN DOOR”, supra note 16, at 11. 
 90. Naula Mole, Background Note on Seeking Asylum and Administrative Procedures, in 
ASYLUM LAW 143,147 (The Judicial Conference on Asylum Law ed., 1995). 
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nature of the process.91  It should be noted that the United Nations document 
most often cited in support of this position, the 1983 ExComm Conclusion No. 
30, may well prove the contrary position.  In fact, ExComm Conclusion No. 30 
is premised upon the notion that applications for refugee status that would be 
subject to an abbreviated procedure are those which are either “clearly 
abusive” or “manifestly unfounded.”92  The actual determination as to whether 
an application could be so categorized was considered to be one of 
“substantive character.”93 
Even within the context of an expeditious process, certain “procedural 
guarantees” are still required.94  Because of the binding nature of the principle 
of non-refoulement upon the U.S., “the integrity of the system of protection 
[must] be assured; this entails the absence of arbitrariness, reasoned 
determinations by trained and informed decision-makers, adequate 
opportunities to present one’s case, including the assistance of appropriately 
qualified interpreters, due process of law, coherence, and consistency.”95 
The arguments that the expedited removal procedures provide these 
guarantees are based upon a comparison with the interview by an asylum 
officer rather than an interview conducted by the I.N.S. in a secondary 
inspection.96  The secondary inspection interview falls far short of ensuring the 
 
 91. Cooper, supra note 75, at 1520-21.  Cooper cites to the UNHCR, Executive Committee 
Conclusion No. 30, The Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee 
Status or Asylum, U.N. GAOR, 38th Session, Supp. No. 12A, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/38/12/ Add.1 
(1983), Available at: <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/excom/exconc/excom30.htm> 
[“ExComm Conclusion No. 30”].  While not directly binding on the U.S., the conclusions of the 
Executive Committee represent recommendations of the consensus of its members, the U.S. 
ranking among them. 
 92. Id. part (d). 
 93. Id. part (e). 
 94. In light of the “grave consequences of an erroneous determination [of refugee status]” 
the recommended guarantees for an applicant for refugee status include: 
(i) . . . .a complete personal interview by a fully qualified official and whenever 
possible, by an official of the authority competent to determine refugee status. 
(ii) [T]he manifestly unfounded or abusive character of an application should be 
established by the authority normally competent to determine refugee status; 
(iii) [A]n unsuccessful applicant should be enabled to have a negative decision 
reviewed before rejection at the frontier or forcible removal from the 
territory. . .This review possibility can be more simplified than that available in 
the case of rejected applications which are not considered manifestly 
unfounded or abusive. 
Ex Comm Conclusion No. 30, part (e), supra note 66. 
 95. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Principles of International Refugee Law, in ASYLUM 11, 23 
(Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, ed. 1995). 
 96. “[T]he procedures in place for expedited removal—including instructions to inspectors, 
notice of the process for asylum seekers, identification of adjudicators, contact with UNHCR, and 
review with suspensive effect—appear to meet the requirements [of ExComm Conclusions Nos. 8 
and 30].”  Cooper, supra note 75 at 1521, n. 74. 
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guarantees required for determining refugee status.  Specifically, the secondary 
inspector is allowed to determine that an application for refugee status is 
“manifestly unfounded.”97  In such a case,  the person making the application 
may be subjected to an abbreviated review process.98  This procedure fails to 
provide the second guarantee suggested by ExComm Conclusion No. 30, that 
“[t]he manifestly unfounded or abusive character of an application should be 
established by the authority normally competent to determine refugee status.”99  
Within the context of expedited removal, it may be argued that the secondary 
inspector is, de facto, the person who makes determinations of refugee status.  
The preemptive effect of a decision not to refer applicants for an interview 
with an asylum officer further demonstrates the pivotal nature of the secondary 
inspection process and further evidences the need for increased review of the 
secondary inspection process.  The simple fact that secondary inspectors have 
been empowered with additional discretion by IIRIRA cannot be considered an 
adequate substitute for the competency required to make such determinations.  
The I.N.S.’s assertion that “those people subject to the expedited removal 
proceeding, experienced INS inspectors review their cases”100 is of little 
consolation when one considers that even the credible fear determinations 
made by experienced asylum officers are sometimes reversed.101 
International human rights standards oblige States to ensure that those who 
claim asylum have access to asylum determination procedures.102  In light of 
the determinative nature of the secondary inspection process, it is of particular 
importance that “airport immigration officials and even the lowest-ranking 
border guards”103 understand the potential ramifications of their actions, both 
for the refugee and the State that employs them. 
ExComm Conclusion No. 30 also suggests a guarantee of review of an 
adverse decision, even if in abbreviated form.104  While I.N.S. inspectors are 
required to receive the approval of a supervisor prior to effectuating any order 
 
 97. ExComm Conclusion No. 30, part (d), supra note 91. 
 98. Id. at part (e)(iii) and (f). 
 99. Id. at part (e)(ii). 
 100. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Public Affairs, FY 1998 Update 
on Expedited Removals, (June 21, 1999) supra note 19. 
 101. Of 131 adverse credible fear decisions made by asylum officers, 12.4% were reversed by 
an immigration judge.  KAREN MUSALO, EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY, CENTER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SECOND YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION OF 
EXPEDITED REMOVAL, Table 50.  Immigration Judge Review Outcomes, EOIR Database (1999). 
<http://www.uchasting.edu/ers/reports/1999/tables.pdf> 
 102. Mole, supra note 90, at 146. 
 103. Id. 
 104. ExComm Conclusion No. 30, supra note 91, part (e)(iii). 
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of removal within the expedited removal context,105 an internal I.N.S. audit 
found that 6 of 27 cases where an alien was ordered removed by the inspector 
were not reviewed or approved by supervisors.106  Additionally, a review of 
case files of similar orders revealed that documentation of supervisory review 
was missing.107  Here again, the guarantees needed to protect refugees from 
non-refoulement can only be effective if properly implemented, and even the 
limited inquiry of the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reveals that the 
I.N.S. has fallen short of doing so.108  When operating under an inspection 
regime that provides abbreviated, if any, review of decisions, “[t]he underlying 
practical issue is one of monitoring and compliance, but experience 
unfortunately confirms that errors of refoulement are more likely when 
procedural shortcuts are taken in zones of restricted guarantees and limited 
access.”109 
By virtue of the manner in which the inspection process is administered to 
all arriving immigrants, including potential asylum seekers, the ports of entry 
of the United States have become such a zone of restricted access.  In fiscal 
year 1998 alone, the I.N.S. reported that expedited removal accounted for 
76,113 of the 115,143 non-criminal removals at ports of entry.110  The total 
number of removals reflected an 82% increase over the previous fiscal year.111  
During the fiscal year 1999, 89,035 aliensited removal, an increase of 
approximately 16 percent over 1998 levels.112  As this number continues to 
grow, so will the risk of refoulement of refugees. 
 
 105. “Any removal order entered by an examining immigration officer pursuant to [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225 (b)(1)] must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate supervisor before the order is 
considered final.” 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (b)(7). 
 106. GAO Report, supra note 84, at 44. (Citing the I.N.S. Office of Internal Audit, Final 
Report Newark District (97-02, Jan. 5, 1998)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. The GAO failed to “undertake to evaluate the accuracy of decision-making in the 
expedited removal process” in spite of the intent of Congress for it to do so. EXPEDITED 
REMOVAL STUDY, supra note 101, III, A, ¶ 1. <http://www.uchasting.edu/ers/reports/1999/99ers 
3.htm> (citing IIRAIRA, Appendix B (Requirement for Study and Report on Implementation of 
Removal Procedures)). 
 109. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 147. 
 110. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Public Affairs,  INS Breaks 
Previous Removals Record; Fiscal Year 1998 Removals Reach 171,154, (Jan. 8, 1999) 
<http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/remove98.htm>. 
 111. Id. 
 112. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Public Affairs, INS Sets New 
Removals Record; Fiscal Year 1999 Removals Reach 176,990, (Nov. 12, 1999), <http://www.ins. 
usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/removal99.pdf> 
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C.  “Credible Fear” Determinations 
ExComm Conclusion No. 30 concludes that the standards of “manifestly 
unfounded” and “abusive” are to be used in determining the viability of 
applications for refugee status.113  Conspicuously absent is any reference to the 
standard of “credible fear” utilized by asylum officers to determine if an 
individual should undergo further screening for asylum in the U.S.114  No 
standard of  “credible fear” exists in the international context.115  While a lack 
of a concrete definition in the international realm is not fatal, the prospect for 
the development of one is dim.  The marked difference between the “credible 
fear” standard and that of “well-founded fear,” (which is used in determining 
one’s eligibility for refugee status) is that there has been an opportunity for 
judicial development of the latter standard.116  Such development is simply not 
possible with the former standard, since, due to the procedural apparatus within 
which it operates, there is no opportunity for the establishment of precedential, 
binding decisions.117  This contrast is troubling for it leaves what have been 
conceded to be “hair breadth judgments” in the hands of officers whose only 
guidance comes from materials provided by the I.N.S.118  The concern, of 
course, is that the “credible fear” standard will not be properly applied as a 
lower screening standard than that used to determine one’s ultimate eligibility 
for asylum that of a “well-founded fear of persecution.” 
While the substance of the materials provided to asylum officers119 seems 
to be properly aligned with the threshold for which it is instructing officers to 
test, the concern again lies with how faithful the asylum officers will be to the 
regulations provided.  Without the review of their decisions on a level that will 
develop precedent, the possibility of repetitive errors cannot be eliminated. 
This problem has already been noted by at least one court.  In AILA et. al. 
v. Reno, the Court expressed concern over the limitation placed upon judicial 
review, saying it was: 
 
 113. ExComm Conclusion No. 30, supra note 91. 
 114. “If the officer determines that the alien has a credible fear of persecution. . .the alien 
shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.”  8 U.S.C. 1225 § 
(b)(1)(B)(ii).  “The term ‘credible fear of persecution’ means that there is a significant possibility, 
taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s 
claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for 
asylum.”  8 U.S.C. 1225 § (b)(1)(B)(v). 
 115. Standard of “manifestly unfounded” requires a far lesser showing than that of “credible 
fear of persecution.” Blum, supra note 5, at 48. 
 116. Cooper, supra note 91, at 1522. 
 117. “No prospect exists, therefore, for a body of jurisprudence on the credible fear standard.”  
Id. at 1523. 
 118. Id. at 1503 and at 1523. 
 119. Here, reference is made to the I.N.S. “Credible Fear” Training Module as cited in 
Cooper, supra note 91, at 1523. 
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troubled by the effects of Congress’s decision to immunize the unwritten 
actions of an agency from judicial review, particularly where. . .so much 
discretion is placed in the hands of individual INS agents who face only a 
supervisor’s review of their decisions.120 
The Court went on to admonish the I.N.S. “in the strongest language possible” 
to follow its own regulations in the treatment of aliens arriving in the United 
States.121  While the recognition of the problem presented by the court-
stripping measures of IIRIRA is welcome, the words of Judge Sullivan have a 
somewhat hollow ring because IIRIRA renders them non-binding upon the 
very agency to which they are directed.  This frustration is endemic of similar 
judicial challenges to IIRIRA. 
One example of the magnitude of the risk for error in expedited removal 
proceedings is set forth in the facts of Diaz v. Reno.122  Mr. Diaz, a U.S. 
Citizen, entered the U.S. at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago on 
February 18, 1998.123  In spite of his claim to citizenship and provision of 
documents proving his status, Mr. Diaz was placed in expedited removal 
proceedings and deported to Mexico without further hearing as required by 8 
C.F.R. § 235.3.  Stripped of his identity documents by the I.N.S., he was not 
able to return to the U.S. until nearly three weeks later.  In its decision, the 
District Court found that Mr. Diaz’s substantive claim against the I.N.S. for 
deportation in contravention of established procedure for processing U.S. 
Citizens at a port of entry was moot.124  This left the I.N.S. without any 
reprimand beyond that of a mandamus order to return Mr. Diaz’s identity 
documents.  While the indignity suffered by Mr. Diaz was certainly 
substantial, some solace may be taken in the fact that he was ultimately able to 
return to the U.S.  The same cannot be said of refugees who fall victim to 
similar errors on the part of I.N.S. inspectors. Whether a refugee is wrongly 
sent away due to an inspector’s failure to follow established procedures, or 
worse yet, failure to recognize the factors that trigger the possibility of a 
“credible fear” interview, the principle of refoulement is equally violated. 
VII. THE TREND OF IIRIRA: CAN IT BE STOPPED? 
A.  Expedited Removal as a Policy of Non-Entrée 
Unfortunately, the exclusionary features of IIRIRA in the United States 
follow a pattern set by Western European nations relying upon such measures 
 
 120. 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 58 (D.D.C. August 20, 1998) (Emmet G. Sullivan, U.S. District 
Judge), aff’d by 199 F.3d 1352 (2000). 
 121. Id. at 64-65. 
 122. 40 F. Supp.2d 984 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 123. Id. at 985. 
 124. Id. at 987. 
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as “safe country” lists and similar mechanisms to deny people access to an 
asylum determination on the merits.125  An increasing proclivity on the part of 
States to adopt policies of “non-entrée” indicates their intention to subvert 
obligations towards refugees, including that of non-refoulement.  Such policies 
come in the form of increased visa requirements for nationals of countries 
which produce a large number of refugees, sanctions on commercial carriers 
for failure to detect fraudulent documents or for allowing the passage of 
undocumented passengers, and even the forcible interdiction of entry of 
refugees at frontiers.126  Whatever the mechanism, “[t]he simple purpose of 
non-entrée strategies is to keep refugees away.”127  The purported objective of 
doing so is to lessen the pressures placed upon States to accept such 
immigrants, to avoid providing temporary refuge to the displaced,128 and to 
avoid the costs of adjudication of claims and detention of refugees during the 
pendency of same. The motivation to avoid such burdens has caused  
“[d]eterrence [to] become official policy for a number of states.”129 
While policies of non-entrée may not always prove to be directly violative 
of the obligation of non-refoulement, the result for would-be refugees is, of 
course, the same.  It is for this reason that the actions of the United States 
during the Haitian refugee crisis of the early 1990s have been the subject of 
intense criticism.  The interdiction and repatriation of Haitians following the 
coup against the Aristide government was ordered by President Bush130 and 
continued by the Clinton administration.  The Supreme Court upheld the action 
in Sale, Acting Commissioner, INS v. Haitian Centers Council, ruling that 
“neither domestic law nor Article 33 of the 1951 Convention limited the power 
of the President to order the Coast Guard to repatriate undocumented aliens, 
including refugees, on the high seas.”131  The decision of the Court limited, in 
effect, the obligations of non-refoulement to aliens who have arrived at a port 
in the U.S..  Such treatment of international law by a domestic court is not 
entirely uncommon, and presents an additional challenge. 
 
 125. For a discussion of the movement towards policies offensive to the 1951 Convention, see 
Maryellen Fullerton, Restricting the Flow of Asylum-Seekers in Belgium, Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands: New Challenges to the Geneva Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights.  29 VA.J.INT’L L. 33 
(1988). 
 126. RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW xx (James C. Hathaway, ed. 1997). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. LOESCHER, supra note 59, at 144. 
 130. See Executive Order No. 12,807: 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992). 
 131. 509 U.S. 155, supra note 33. 
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B.  The Problem of Bringing International Law to Bear in U.S. Courts 
In light of the seemingly obvious violations of customary norms of 
international refugee law by the U.S., the need for redress is apparent.  While 
the Refugee Convention does not include a means to enforce its requirements 
upon party States, the status of non-refoulement as a customary norm, let alone 
its binding nature upon states through treaties, would appear to provide ample 
fodder for a domestic court to take up the role of enforcing the same.132  
Unfortunately, several cases dealing with non-refoulement have borne out an 
inclination on the part of the courts not to acknowledge this norm as a binding 
one.  Using often circuitous reasoning, U.S. courts have successfully refrained 
from finding an obligation of the Executive branch to act in accordance with 
these norms. 
The insistence of domestic courts that the principle of non-refoulement as 
contained in the Protocol is not self-executing, provides further evidence of 
their disregard of this principle.  One author formulated that “[t]he tendency to 
find Article 33’s clear, mandatory command to be domestically unenforceable 
in the absence of identically worded implementing legislation is yet another 
symptom of the courts’ general disregard of international law, especially where 
individuals seek its protection against law-breaking conduct of U.S. 
officials.”133  As a norm or otherwise, courts balk at recognizing an obligation 
of non-refoulement. 
The problem often encountered in the course of trying to prove customary 
international law to a court has been referred to as the “blank stare 
phenomenon.”134  Such a label is not meant to be condescending, but is more 
likely “owing to judges’ typical unfamiliarity with and resistance to 
international standards.”135  Indeed, as practice has proven, “judicial 
skepticism is one of the largest obstacles for a lawyer trying to use customary 
law in domestic litigation.”136  While a certain degree of judicial hesitancy is 
understandable, especially in cases involving such a political “hot potato” as 
immigration.137  However, when addressing situations such as the admissibility 
 
 132. “When international law protects individual rights against governments, then 
enforcement of international law falls squarely within the traditional notion of judicial 
responsibility.” Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 
YALE L.J. 2277, 2308 (1991). 
 133. Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law. 15 BERKELEY  J. 
INT’L L. 1, 10 (1997). 
 134. Paul L. Hoffman, Problems of Proving International Human Rights Law in U.S. Courts: 
The “Blank Stare Phenomenon”: Proving Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 181 (1996). 
 135. Fitzpatrick, supra note 133, at 24. 
 136. Hoffman, supra note 134, at 181. 
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branches of government  in [refugee and immigration issues], especially if it entails granting 
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of refugees,  whose lives often hang in the balance, “[t]he mandate of U.S. 
courts to protect the human rights of aliens and refugees would seem to be 
clear.”138  In light of the fact that courts have repeatedly failed to do so, 
however, “the pursuit of political strategies may be a more effective way of 
encouraging compliance with international refugee norms than expending the 
bulk of one’s energies in court.”139 
The administration of even straightforward regulations has presented 
problems for the I.N.S.  It is perhaps too much to expect then, that any test 
developed by a court could be applied by officials of the same agency with any 
more success.  The lack of judicial review provided for in IIRIRA, coupled 
with the dim prospect of the development of standards that would be helpful in 
bringing U.S. law into line with international norms, leads this author to 
conclude that statutory reform may well be the only hope for the preservation 
of refugee protection in the U.S. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In light of the totality of the restrictions placed upon admission to the U.S. 
by IIRIRA, there is no room to allow for any limitation upon the fundamental 
principle of non-refoulement.  The expedited removal procedures instituted by 
IIRIRA are a threat to asylum seekers, as they limit access to the very 
mechanism that is designed to offer protection to asylum seekers.  What is now 
lacking is similar protection of the principle of non-refoulement.  The attempts 
of the I.N.S. to implement regulations in an effort to compensate for IIRIRA’s 
failure to guarantee such protections have proven to be inadequate.  It is, of 
course, the untold consequences of this action that belie its severity as to: 
refugees and other aliens, the destruction of the ordinary checks of publicity 
and review provides dangerous opportunities for arbitrary behavior.  The 
absence of any evidence that this innovation was needed makes its imposition 
all the more regrettable.140 
The conclusion that the procedures created by IIRIRA “appear susceptible 
of fair application meeting the international standards”141 may not be entirely 
untrue.  However, until such time as there is no longer a possibility of these 
procedures being applied in a manner that contravenes the requirements of 
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international refugee law, the U.S. continues to breach the duty it owes to 
refugees.  The manner in which the I.N.S. has implemented the process of 
expedited removal shows little promise for a consistent and compliant 
application of IIRIRA.  The continued denial by the I.N.S. of access and data 
regarding the expedited removal process “continues to insulate [it] from 
careful scrutiny and evaluation.”142 This denial of access has deprived human 
rights advocates of the information necessary to ensure appropriate reform of 
the expedited removal process.  Absent a statutory mandate that would 
introduce safeguards for refugees into the expedited removal process, the U.S. 
will continue to “[imperil] bona fide refugees.”143  As long as expedited 
removal continues to place refugees at risk, it is not easy to foresee how the 
U.S. could be found to be in compliance with international norms of refugee 
protection against refoulement. 
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